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Web applications are typically developed with hard 
time constraints and are often deployed with software 
bugs. One important type of bug is the one that creates 
security vulnerabilities. Knowing what kind of 
programming mistakes usually lead to security 
vulnerabilities can be an important tool to help in the 
detection and prevention of security flaws. In this 
paper we describe ongoing work on correlating 
software faults and security vulnerabilities like Cross 




Security is a major concern in web applications. In 
fact, web applications developers are normally focused 
on the application functionalities and on satisfying the 
user’s requirements and easily neglect security aspects. 
Even assuming that key infrastructure components 
such as web servers and database management systems 
(DBMS) are fully secure (which is far from being 
guaranteed), poor web application code represents a 
major risk, as can be confirmed by innumerous 




For example, according to Acunetix audit results [1] 
“on average 70% of websites are at serious and 
immediate risk of being hacked... 91% of these 
websites, contained some form of website 
vulnerability, ranging from the more serious such as 
SQL Injection and XSS to more minor ones such as 
local path disclosure or directory listing”. 
These security vulnerabilities give attackers an easy 
gateway to valuable assets like the access to 
unauthorized data, execution of database stored 
procedures, or even gain access to privileged database 
accounts, impersonate another user, mimicry web 
applications, or even get access to the web server.  
Our idea is to analyze how software faults correlate 
with security vulnerabilities they may generate. The 
goal is to observe the kind of security vulnerabilities 
that are generated by each type of faults in order to 
understand what types of faults contribute more to 
vulnerabilities such as XSS and SQL injection.  
The injection of software faults to study security 
breaches is a new research topic that can be used for a 
variety of studies in the security area. For example, it 
can be used to guide code reviewers or to compare the 
detection coverage of automatic vulnerability scanners. 
Injection of realistic software faults can also be used to 
build attack injection tools, which could be the 
equivalent of a classical fault injection tool for security 
assessment (e.g., to evaluate Intrusion Detection 
Systems or Firewalls). 
 
2. Mapping software faults with 
vulnerabilities 
 
In our study, we inject the most frequent types of 
software programming errors (according to the field 
study presented in [2]) to check what kind of 
vulnerabilities they may produce when applied to web 
applications. We should clarify that we are talking 
about vulnerabilities in applications, and not 
vulnerabilities in components such as web servers, that 
are dependent on the configuration.  
There are several automatic Web Vulnerability 
Scanners available to detect vulnerabilities in web 
applications after deployment. Most of them are 
commercial tools such as Acunetix Web Vulnerability 
Scanner [3], Spidynamics Webinspect [4], Whatchfire 
AppScan [5], Buyservers Falcove [6], and N-Stalker 
Web Application Security Scanner [7]. There are also 
some freeware application scanners like Gamja [8], but 
they lack most of the functionalities of their 
commercial counterparts and are not so accurate. 
The XSS and the SQL injection are the most 
frequent types of vulnerabilities in websites and are 
considered as critical vulnerabilities by the 
vulnerability scanners. 
Our study is based on two steps: 1) we inject 
software faults in a web application (one fault at each 
time) and 2) we use Web vulnerability scanners to 
check if the injected fault has created any security 
vulnerability in the target application. As we injected 
different types of faults we can obtain a map that 
relates types of faults with the vulnerabilities they may 
create.  
We use the G-SWFIT (Generic Software Fault 
Injection Technique) [2] technique to inject the 
software faults. G-SWFIT is based on a set of fault 
injection operators that reproduce most common types 
of software faults directly in the target executable 
code. These fault injection operators resulted from a 
field study that analyzed and classified more than 500 
real software faults discovered in several programs, 
identifying the most common (the “top-N”) types of 
software faults [2]. Once the target application in the 
current study are PHP web applications, which are 
different form the C and C++ application used in [2], 
we had to introduce some necessary adaptations to the 
fault models (but without changing the type of fault 
represented by each fault model). As the faults injected 
are based on the most frequent ones observed in the 
field [2], we believe that the faults injected in our 
study do represent the faults that are likely to exist in 
web application code. 
In the current stage of the study, we have used only 
3 types of faults, corresponding to 26% of all the 
software faults observed in [2]. A comprehensive fault 
injection campaign is planned covering all the types of 
faults identified in [2]. 
For the evaluation experiments we used a web 
application developed in LAMP (Linux operating 
system, Apache web server, Mysql database and PHP 
programming language). This LAMP topology 
represents one of the most used combinations of 
technologies to build web sites. It is also in this kind of 
setup that the largest number of security vulnerabilities 
is found mainly due to SQL injection and XSS. 
After the injection of each fault, the detection of 
possible vulnerabilities is carried out by two web 
application vulnerability scanners: Acunetix Web 
Vulnerability Scanner [3] and Whatchfire AppScan 
[5]. The scanners perform a comprehensive search for 
vulnerabilities as they execute hundreds or even 
thousands of tests for each vulnerability type (XSS, 
SQL injection, path traversal, buffer overflow, denial 
of service, brute force, etc.). Although the scanner may 
report other vulnerabilities, for the time being we are 
only interested in the XSS and SQL injection types. 
Before each experiment the web system is reset to the 
initial state and only one software fault is injected in 
each test. 
 
3. Preliminary results and discussion 
The web application code under test has around 
1.500 lines of code. This application has 168 fault 
locations for the 3 fault types used and the results of 
the preliminary experiments are in Table 1. 
Table 1 – Experiment results 
Fault Types # Faults XSS SQL Inject. 
Missing “If (cond) {statement(s)}” 23 1 0 
Missing function call 98 4 20 
Missing “AND EXPR” in 
expression used as branch condition 48 4 0 
The faults injected leaded to software bugs and 
application malfunctioning, but they also produced a 
considerable amount of security vulnerabilities (around 
17%). As we can see, SQL injection vulnerabilities 
appears only for the fault type “Missing function call”, 
while XSS is generated by all the fault types used. In 
the next steps of our work we will use more fault types 
and other web applications to check the possibility of 
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